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Abstract 
The air transportation ind'jstry has been described as a highly-competitive, 
regulated oligopoly or as a price-re;Julated cartel with blocked entry, result-
ing in excessive service; and 10"1 load factors. The current structure of the 
industry has been strongly influenced by the hypotheses that increased levels 
of competition are desirable per se, and that more competing carri.ers can be 
economically supported in larger markets, in longer-haul markets, with lower 
unit costs, and with higher fare levels. An·elementary application of 
competition/game theory casts doubt on the validity of these hypotheses, but 
rather emphasizes the critical importance of the short-term non-variable costs 
in determining economic levels of competition. 
In trod uction 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COMPETITION 
IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
by Herbert B. Hubbard, United Air Lines 
Airlines are regulated and controlled by the government as public utilities 
because their services are deemed essential from the public standpoint and, 
accordingly, must be rendered efficiently. Furthermore, the economies of 
large-scale production and decreasing unit costs tend to increase the size 
of the business unit, and government regulation is designed to prevent the 
potential attendant unreasonable or unfair rates or inferior or inadequate serv-
ice. However, unlike most other public utilities, few airlines enjoy monopoly 
situations with exclusive franchises for a number of years. Airlines are 
highly-regulated public utilities, but are also highly competitive. 
Economists have defined airlines as "a blocked-entry, price-controlled, non-
price-competing cartel," or as highly competitive but regulated ol1gopc)lies, 
with their products essentially undifferentiated, with entry of new comretitors 
into a market difficult because of the entrance fee in terms of government regu-
lation and capital costs, and in which the actions of each competitor (who 
supplies significant portions of the total product) can have a marked effect on 
the plans and actions of the other competitors. The classical economic theories 
for monopolies and pure competition do not apply to the air transportation indus-
try, because there are generally more than one competitor in a market, but 
there are only a limited number of competitors. However, the economic situa-
tion of the airlines (that is, the imperfect competition of oligopolies) lends 
itself less easily to theoretical analyses than do monopolies a.nd pure 
competition. 
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It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the economic effect of competition 
in the air transportation industry in terms of the efficient allocation of resources. 
The paper will include a discussion of competition, certain basic economic 
factors in the industry, the types of scheduling decisions made, the importance 
of flight share in determir.ing market share, an illustration of the application of 
competition/game theory by means of a simplified example, and a summary of 
the apparent results of competition with conclusions. The derivation of the 
various mathematical relationships are included in the appendices. 
COMPETITION 
Competition is considered to be healthy and desirable in the American economy. 
There is competition in the transportation industry (1) between the various seg-
ments or modes of the industry and (2) within the various segments as certifi-
cated by governmental agencies. In the first case, we have a "natural" variety 
of competition in which technological improvements are paramount and which 
often results in substantial benefits to the public in the form of improved service 
and/or lower rates. On the other hand, the second type of competition, with 
multiple (more than 2 or 3) competitors, has tended to depress the economic via-
bility of the carriers with negligible benefits to the public. 
The expansion of route awards in the air transportation industry has made the govern-
ment policy in this area well known. The amount of competition among the airlines 
has been increased substantially during recent years. In most cases, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board has not recognized nor fully considered the probable impact of 
such awards on the economic viability of the established carriers. 
There is a fundamental question as to the amount of competition within the air 
transportation industry that is desirable and supportable from an economic 
efficiency pOint of view! 
Federal Aviation Act, Section 102 - Declaration of Policy 
" •••• the Board shall consider •••• as being in the public inter05t •••• , 
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develUj'lm~nt 
of an air transportation' system •••• without •••• unfair or destructive 
competitive practices." 
Bermuda Capacity Principles 
" •••• strong adherence of the United States •••• authorizing designated 
carriers to conduct their operations without predetermined limits on 
capacity, but subject to ex post facto review to require elimination of 
unjustified capacity •••• other countries are less enamored of the Ber-
muda capacity principles and wish to follow more restrictive poliCies 
than we in controlling capacity and scheduling." 
d59 
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C.A.B. Statement in the_e.ou~:i8i!1 Service to the West Case (l95U 
." •••• accumulaIna experience strongly suggests that we may have: 
reached, and in some C33es even exceeded, the optimum number 
of certificated services that can be economically supported by the 
available traffic. " 
Honorable Charles S. Murphy, Chairman, C.A.B., November 16,196'1 
'i •••• the American economy is generally a competitive economy. For 
the most part, we depend upon free· competition among private busi-
ness enterprises to achieve the most efficient use of resources •••• 
belief that vigorous competition is a good thing - even in the airline 
. Industry ." 
Honorable Secor D. Brown, Chairman, GoA. Bot August, 1970 
"The cardinal sins of the regulators have been in legislating, in effect, 
wasteful, ruinous over-competition along our routes and then interven-
ing unwisely to forestall the natural adjustments for over-competition 
- merger, statesmanlike agreement, or b'lsiness faHure." 
Critical Hypotheses 
There appear to be several hypotheses that gained rather wide acceptance among 
members within the industry and among observers and analysts of the industry, 
and that have influenced the cun-ent structure of the industry and level of 
competition; 
1. Increased levels of competition are deemed desirable per se. 
2. More competing carriers can be economically supported; 
a. In larger passenger inarkets (in terms of passengers p,oT day), 
b. In longer-haul markets (with gl-eater revenues per passe:lqer), 
c. With lower unit costs (in terms of cents per available seat mile), 
d. With higher fare levels (in terms of cents per revenue passenger 
mile), and, 
e. With newer technology (with resulting economies of scale). 
3. Increases in market share will result in greater profits. 
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BASIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
An evaluation of the air transportation industry must recognize economies of 
scale, the lumpiness (large incremental step-functions) of various types of 
costs I and marginal analysis for determining the efficient economic allocation 
of resources. 
COSTS 
VARIABLE 
VARIABLE 
CHART I 
VARIABLE I TO I 
no I NON-VARIABLE 
SMAll 
NON-V IABLE 
o~--------------~----------~-----
SCALE OF OPERATIONS 
Economies of Scale 
Chart 1 shows a theoretical variation in total costs as a function of the scale 
of operations. A small firm might have essentially no fixed costs but relatively 
high variable costs. A medium-sized firm may have some non-variable fixed 
costs and, as a result, somewhat lower variable costs, in which the total vari-
able costs might be three times the non-variable costs, or, in other words, the 
total costs might be four times the total non-variable fixed costs. An even 
larger firm might have significantly higher non-variable fixed costs, with even 
lower unit variable costs such that the total costs might be only two times the 
non-variable fixed costs. These relationships show a decreasing total unit cost 
with increasing scale of operation. 
Because various costing methodologies tend to be rather subjective, it is diffi-
cult to categorize certain costs as totally variable ,HId others as completely 
fixed or non-variable in the short term of six months to one year. (Over the 
di.o/ 
, 
longer term, all costs must be considered as variable.) However, in contrast 
to some economists' contentions, our analyses and detailed costing models have 
shown the above economies of scale (decreasing unit costs) with great accuracy 
for United and other carriers, with total costs ranging from 2 to 3 times the non-
variable fixed costs. (Such economies of scale have led to the establishment 
of "natural" monopolies in other industries.) 
Lumpiness of COsts 
There are four different levels of costs which must be recognized: costs per 
unit, costs per production lot, costs for capital eqUipment, and overhead costs. 
Certain airline costs tend to vary directly with the volume of passengers served 
(i.e., tickets, meals, insurance, reservations costs, etc.) and can be handled 
as a deduction to obtain the net fare yield per passenger. Other costs are quite 
lumpy, such as the marginal operating costs for a given flight (prinCipally fuel, 
crew, and direct maintenance costs) which are essentially independent of 
the passenger loads. The capital costs of the equipment vary with the number 
of airplanes, each of which is used on one or more trips per day. Other airline 
costs are established on the basis of the plaJ;\l1ed scale of operations and do not 
vary with individual scheduling decisions. 
Marginal Analysis 
For economiC efficiency, a. firm should expand its volume of operations until 
the marginal revenues just equal marginal cost, in order to maximize its profits 
or minimize its losses, as shown in Chart 2. 
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CHART 2 
Although a certain minimum volume of operations might be required to realize 
the marginal revenue curve shown, the area between the marginal revenue line 
and the marginal cost line represents ':he total contribution to non-variable 
costs. It should be noted that the marginal cost curve has not been assumed 
to turn up with increasing volumes in accordance with the classical economists' 
theory, but rather shows no dis-economies of scale. 
SCHEDULING DECISIONS 
Analyses have shown that the basic schedule pattern for an airline determines 
80-90% of its revenues, determines 70-90% of its costs, and also establishes 
85-95% of its total capital investment. The basiC schedule pattern is estab-
lished on the basis of a series of scheduling decisions for all of the various 
airport-pair time markets, together with their interrelationships. For the pur-
pose of Simplification, but without distorting the basiC factors, there are really 
only three types of scheduling decisions for an ail'port-pair time market: 
1. DeCision to add or subtract a flight, which is an integer number 0 
(It is relatively easy to add a flight in a market, but quite difficult 
to reduce service, in view of various community pressures.) 
2, DeCision to change the type of airplane providing the service. 
3. Decision to move a flight earlier or later during the day. 
MARKET SHARE 
Accurate forecasts of market share are essential for the schedule planning and 
equipment purchase decisions, and for the resulting workforce planning, facUi-' 
ties planning, etc. Experience has shown that an increase in frequency in a 
major competitive market is generally accompanied by an increase in market 
share and an· attendant increase in revenue. In fact, frequency of service is 
probably the strongest competitive tool in the airlines' "bag of tricks.' 
A carrier in search of an increased part of the total industry revenues may act in 
a rational manner by adding one flight on a segment. His competitors, seeing 
their share of the market slip and their revenues decline, may act in an equally 
rational manner by adding one flight in an attempt to retain their market share 
and profits, After some" settling" time, each carrier could be back to its origi- .. 
nal market share, so that its operating revenues would be unchanged. However, 
each carrier would have increased its operating costs by the expense of the addi-
tional flight. It can been seen that by.changing a relatively stable two-carrier 
market into a three, four # and sometimes five-carrier market,: it becomes ·more 
volatile # with the possibility that one carrier will set off a chain-like reaction. 
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The increase in frequency (capacity and costs), with a resulting reduction in 
load factor, due to the competitive nature of the industry has been explained 
by Mr. Joseph V. Yance, consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Transpor-
tation (CAB Docket 21866-6, Exhibit DOT-RT-l, pages 6 and 7): 
"As we noted earli'lf, Arneric<l.n, United, and TWA argue that the number of 
competitors in a market has an impact on load factors. In general, the 
more competitors in a market, the lower the load factors of carriers serv-
ing that market. Our theoretical analysis of carrier behavior supports 
this view. 
"The reasoning is as follows. What is critical to an airline in making its 
schedule deCision is the number of "new passengers" attracted by an addi-
tional flight. (By" new passengers," we mean passengers the airline is 
not already carrying on its existing flights.) In either a monopoly or a 
competitive market, the number of new passengers required to sustain a 
flight is the same. But the relation between new passengers and average 
load on board varies significantly between the two types of markets. In a 
monopoly market, apart from passengers who are flying because of the 
additional service and who would not fly absent such new service, all of 
the passengers on board a new flight are drawn from other flights of the 
(same) airline; hence unless the number of persons who would first fly 
because of the new service is large enough to cover the costs of a new 
flight, the flight will not be added. 
"The situation is very different in a competitive market. There, new pas-
sengers will consist of (1) those persons first traveling because of the 
additional service (as in the case of a monopoly market), and (2) passengers 
diverted from existing flights of other airlines. It may thus be profitable 
for a carrier to add a flight, even though overall load factors in the market 
decline. On the basis of this analysis, one cause for the decrease in load 
factors one observes over time is the increasing competitiveness of markets." 
"S" Curve Rela tionships 
Many analyses have been made to relate the market share (or percentao;,.~ parti-
cipation in the total passenger market) to the flight share (or relative number of 
flights per day), as shown in Chart 3. The relationship line will obviously pass 
through the origin and the (100,100) end point, and in a two-carrier market, will 
generally pass through the (50,50) pOint. Some analysts have concluded that there 
is an "S" -shaped curve effect, since a majority of the points in the 15-35% range 
are below the diagonal regression line, while a majority of the pOints in the 65-
90% range are above it. Such an "S"-shaped curve would imply that the carrier 
with the highest frequency share would get a disproportionate market share, and 
that therefore the way to make greater profits is to be the schedule leader. Such 
reasoning might lead a carrier to emphasize market share and growth to the 
neglect of the profit objective. 
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The Civil Aeronautics Board released on July 21, 1970 (CAB 70-96, 382-6031), 
the first of a projected series of staff studies evaluating route awards made by 
the Board in recent years. It was their first attempt to determine whether the 
carriers have actually performed in accordance with the anticipation and intent 
of the Board. Some of the conclusions reached in the pilot study included: 
" 2 • The total number of flights and the proportionate share of non-stop 
flights were greater under competition. 
"4. There appears to be generally a close relationship between the share 
of flights provided by each carrier and the share in traffic." 
In order to analyze the effect of competition, it is not necessary to a~"'ume an 
"S"-shaped curve but to merely recognize that a change in the frequene-y share 
by one carrier will effect its market share. High correlation coefficients in the 
regressions of market share against flight share have been interpreted as prov-
ing the validity of the "S" shape. However, in most analyses, the regression 
hypothesis is actually whether greater frequency means greater market share, 
not whether greater frequency means a disproportionate market share. 
Linear Regression Analysis 
As part of United's rebuttal testimony in Phase 6 of the General Domestic 
Passenger Fare Investigation (Docket 21866-6, Exhibits UR-T-1, pages 12 
and 13, and Exhibits UR-8 and 9), the results of a linear regression analysis 
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of all of the basic data contained in the C.A.B. Bureau of Economics Exhibits 
BE 6502 (Columns 8 and 10) for all competitive sample markets were summarized: 
Market Share 
(in %) 
= 1. 09 x Flight Share - 3.7 
(in %) 
280 Observations* 
Coefficient of Determination (R2) = 91. 4% of Total Variance 
Standard Error of Estimate = 6.48 percentage points 
F level = 30.05 
* In order to avoid the inherent auto-correlation among 
the data for all carriers in a market, only one data 
point was used for a two-carrier market, two data 
points for a three-carrier market, etc. 
These results show the extremely high correlation which actually exists between 
market share and flight share, based on the extensive basic data assembled by 
the C.A.B. Bureau of Economics. Furthermore, an analysis made of the excep-
tional variances, between the actual and the predicted values for the various 
city-pair markets included in the regression analYSiS, highlighted the practical 
aspects of on-line, through, and connecting service and the factor of market 
identity. By recognizing these differences, the relationship between market 
share and flight share would have become even greater than that indicated in 
the correlation analysis. It would be very difficult to improve these simple 
linear regression results (with a nominal threshold value) by more complicated 
and sophisticated curvilinear relationships to approximate the "s" curve. Accord-
ingly, the following analysis is based initially on the simple diagonal relation-
ship (that is, market share = flight share), and later extended to cover a linear 
regression with a threshold value and a possible curvilinear relationship. 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
The following competition/game theory analysis is based on two basic assumptions: 
1. There is no collusion. overt or tacit, among competitors. 
2. Each carrier purchases and schedules equipment in its own self-
interest, i.e.: 
a. Each carrier expands its production (schedules) up to the 
limit of capacity whenever marginal revenues exceed 
marginal costs, and, 
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b. Each carrier purchases additional equipment if the marginal 
contribution exceeds marginal capital costs. 
The second assumption would preclude an airline from seeking growth or 
increased market share at the expense of profit. 
EXAMPLE OF COMPETITION 
The following simplified example is based on a reasonably typical airport-pair 
time market: 
Potential Market (If 3 or More Flights) 200 passengers per day 
Net Fare Yield $67.20 per passenger 
Airplane Seating Capacity 100 seats 
Variable Costs $1,400 per flight 
By Simple arithmetic, it can be seen that if this were a monopoly market with 
only Airline" A" certificated, that carrier would probably operate three (or pos-
sibly four) flights. 
Revenues Per Day 
Variable Costs Per Day 
Net Contribution Per Day 
Passenger Load Factor 
Two Carriers 
3 Flights 
$13,440 
4,200 
$ 9,240 
67% 
4 Flights 
$13,440 
5,600 
$ 7,840 
50% 
If Airline" B" were to be certificated as a new competitor in this market, with 
three flights already operated by Airline "A" , it would be faced with the mar-
ginal economic analysis shown in Chart 4, based on the direct diagont..~ 
relationship of market share against flight share. For example, if Airli;':' "B" 
operates one flight out of a total of four flights, the marginal revenue for that 
flight would be one-fourth x $13,440, or $3,360. Airline "B", accordingly, 
would probably operate two flights in the market, because the total contribution 
for these two flights would be $2,580 per day, $60 greater than if it operated 
three flights. 
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However, Airline" A" would now find that its contribution from the market could 
be increased by $60 if it cut back to two flights per day. The net result would 
be four flights in the market (two by "An and two by n Bn), with an average pas-
senger load factor ·of 50%. However, if each airline hoped to increase its share 
of the market from 50% to 60% at a daily cost of $60, the net result might be six 
flights in the market (three by "A" and three by'; Bn), with an average passenger 
load factor of 33% and with each airline realizing $1,400 per day less contribu-
tion than if each airline operated only two flights in the market. Chart 4 also 
demonstrates graphically the potential impact of attempting to increase market 
share at the expense of profit. 
Three Carriers 
If a third carrier, Airline n C n, were to be authorized, with four flights CI :ready 
serving the market (two by n A" and two by "B"), ·Airline "e" would opera,e at 
least one flight with a contribution of $1,290 per day, but probably two flights 
with a total contribution of $1,680 per day. A third flight by "c" would have 
a negative contribution. Neither" An nor n B" could improve its own contribu-
tion by either increasing or decreasing its frequency. The net result would be 
six flights in the market (two each by "A", "8n , and "C"), with an average pas-
senger load factor of 33%. 
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Four Carriers 
In a similar manner, the authorization of a fourth airline, "D" I would tend to 
result in eight flights in the market, with an average load factor of 25% and a 
contribution of only $560 per airline, which probably would be inadequate to 
cover the allocated capital costs and those cost factors not directly related to 
this market. 
Scheduling Strategy 
Chart 5 illustrates the results of various scheduling strategies for the example 
case, based on the simplified (and most favorable) relationship that market 
share equals flight share. 
Ma_mt Share 
Rewnue MARKET SHARE = FLIGHT SHARE 
Cost NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BY COMPETitoRS COnlri6u11Oii 
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100'10 
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The horizontal rows, for various number of flights that we might operate, show 
the results when faced by various number of flights operated by our competitor(s) • 
The entries in each box show our market share, our resulting revenue based on 
that market share, our variable costs at $1,400 per flight, our contribution from 
the market, and the passenger load factors for our flights and for the industry. 
For example, if we expect our competitors to operate four flights, our greatest 
contribution from the market would be $1,680 by our operating two flights. 
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The results for the industry may be summarized as follows: 
Market Revenues $l3,440 per day 
Variable Costs $ 1,400 per flight 
Number of Carriers (0) 1 2 3 4 
Flights/Carrier 3 2 2 2 
Total Flights 3 4 6 8 
Passenger Load Factor 67% 50% 33% 25% 
Industry Revenues $13,440 $13,440 $13,440 $13,440 
Industry Costs 4,200 5,600 8,400 11,200 
Industry Net $ 9,240 $ 7,840 $ 5,040 $ 2,240 
This summary can be extended to show the industry profits resulting if the vari-
able costs represent only 67% or 50% of the total costs: 
If Variable = 67% Total Costs 
Non-Variable Charge 2,100 2,800 4,200 5,600 
Industry Profit $ 7,140 $ 5,040 $ 840 $-3,360 
If Variable = 50% Total Costs 
Non-Variable Charge 4.200 5.600 8.400 11.200 
Industry Profit $ 5,040 $ 2,240 $-3,360 $-8,960 
For this illustrative airport-pair time market, foW" competitors would incW". sig-
nificant losses and three competitors would have either inadequate returns on 
their investments or losses. 
J. 7(j 
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COMPETITION THEORY ~7/ 
The results of the simplified example can be generalized by the use of micro-
economic analysis combined with an elementary form of competition/game 
theory. However, this application is really not the classical game theory, 
as developed by J. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but rather is derived 
by the simple application of high school partial differential equations. 
Appendix A-I shows that if each carrier adds flights as long as the marginal 
revenues equal or exceed the marginal cost, and if the market share equals 
the flight share: 
of Flights for (opum"m N"ml"") (Industry Market Revenues) X (0;/) = 
Each Carrier (Variable Costs Per Flight) 
For 0 2 , (0 ;21) 1 = = 4 
For 0 3 , (°02 I) 2 = = 9 
For 0 4 , (00-2 1) 3 = = 16 
In this relationship, 0 represents the number of equal competitors in a particu-
lar airport-pair time market, with equal drawing power for each competitor's 
flights. The industry market revenues per day are available to all competitors 
in the market. In the short term, the variable costs per flight might represent 
only the costs for fuel, crew, and direct maintenance, but over the longer term 
would have to include the capital costs for additional equipment. This equa-
tion also assumes that the industry market revenue forecasts made at the time 
of equipment purchase actually materialize when the equipment is placed into 
service. If not, the number of trips scheduled will exceed the optimum number, 
making the resulting contributions and profits lower than this equation would 
suggest. 
Application of the above equation to the illustrative example results in the 
following comparison of the theoretical optimum number of flights for each 
"arrier versus the number determined previously: 
. $13,440 
EquatlOn: $ 1,440 X 
Q - 1 
0 2 
As Determined Previously 
In Example 
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Number of Carriers (0) 
_1_ _2_ _3_ 4 
2.4 2.1 1.8 
3 2 2 2 
Total Industry Relationships 
Appendix A-2 extends the above relationship to the total industry by simple 
algebraic manipulation: 
• Total Flights = 
(Industry Market Revenues) 
(Variable Costs Per Flight) x (0; 1) 
TOTAL 
FLIGHTS 
20 
5 
Total Costs = g x (Industry Market Revenues) 
Where g = 
(Total Costs) 
(Variable Costs) 
Operating Ratio 
• Profit Margin 
• For Breakeven 
g(O~I) 
1-9(001) 
g(O;I)_ 1 
= 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BY INDUSTRY 
(Airport - Pair Time Markell 
TOTAl • 
"',,"TI 
o~----+-----~----~----~----~----~ 15 
Total Industry Flights 
x (Q 0 1) 
CHART 6 
Chart 6 shows the total number of industry flights as a function of the ratio of 
total market revenues to variable costs per flight for various numbers of carriers 
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in an airport-pair time market. It can be seen that the total number of industry 
flights tends to vary directly with the market size and fare level, and varies 
inversely with the variable costs per flight. It also increases with the number 
of carriers. However, it will tend to follow a stepped function because of the 
requirement of an integer number of flights by each carrier. 
The service to the traveling public may be improved by the increased number 
of flights, but it should be recognized that the costs and capital investments 
vary also with the increased number of flights, resulting in a deterioration of 
the return on investment for each carrier. Similarly, the actual passenger load 
factor realized will be decreased with an increased number of competitors. 
On the other hand, the service to the traveling public may not be improved with 
an increase in the number of competitors. A monopoly carrier could provide 
good service with five flights, spaced at desirable departure times throughout 
the day; whereas three carriers in the same market might operate three flights 
each for a total of nine flights, but with three competing flights peaked at the 
three largest-demand periods of the day, since this can be shown to be the 
"best" strategy for each competing carrier. 
Profit Margin 
Chart 7 shows that the profit margin for the industry is a function of the ratio of 
total costs to variable costs and the number of carriers, covering a representa-
tive range of values. 
I (TOTAL COSTS\{O • I) PROfIT MARCIN - - \VARiABU tOSi~T 
WH(l1E 0 - NUMBER OF CARRIERS CERTIFICATED 
TOTAL COSTX' NUMBER Of CARRIERS 101 
VARIABLE COSTS 2 1 4 S 6 
2.00 0 -ll" -501 ... -67" 
1.50 25 .. 0 -12'10 •• -25ft CHART 7 
1.33 33 .. II .. 0 -6t. -II" 
1.25 37" 17" 6t. 0 -... 
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It is enlightening to see that the profit margin is apparently not sensitive to 
the absolute levels of costs, but is quite sensitive to the ratio of total costs 
to variable costs. The higher this ratio becomes, the lower the air transporta-
tion industry's profits will be. Unfortunately. the trend of this ratio overtime 
has been definitely upward in the air transportation industry as a result of 
greatly increased capital investments for new aircraft. ground equipment. and 
facilities. In addition, the annual charges by local airports have risen sub-
s tanUally during recent yeap3 0 Furthermore, labor contracts are tending in 
various ways toward greater job security in one form or another, which has the 
effect of converting variable costs into more fixed, longer-term commitments 
to the employees. Since the variable cost of flying a Jet a certain distance is 
not substantially greater than that for a piston aircraft over the same distance, 
the end result of the jet technology has been that higher fixed costs must be 
allocated over relatively fewer units of production. 
Chart 7 shows that, regardless of the size of the market and regardless of the 
fare level, a three-competitor market can be little better than a break-even 
operation, and that for healthy profits, only two competitors may be tolerated 
in any market. 
Break-even Operation 
Chart 8 shows that the maximum number of carriers in any market is equal to 
the ratio of total costs to non-variable costs and is independent of market size, 
length of haul, unit cost, and fare level. 
FOR BREAK-EVEN. OPERATING RATIO - lO 
f. TOTAL COSTS )(0-1) • lO 
\VARIABl£ COSTS \0 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CARRIERS 10') 
• ( TOTAL COSTS ) . TOlAL COSTS 
o - TOlAL coSts - VARIABl£ coSts - NON-VARiA8l£ costs 
TOTAL COST~ MAXIMUM NUMBER 
NON-VARIABl£ COSTS OF CARRIERS 
2 2 
3 3 
• 4 
5 5 
INDEPENDENT OF MARKET SIZE. l£NGTH OF HAUl, UNIT COSTS. AND FARE L£VD. 
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CHART 8 
This rather simple relationship, easy to understand, might also be applicable 
to other industries and firms which have relatively high fixed costs, such as 
the fertilizer, plastic. steel, and automotive industries, and possibly even 
applicable to the number of filling stations at a busy intersection. 
Further Extensions 
The preceding derivation and results were based on certain simplified assump-
tions, but what would be the result if the various carriers in a market are not 
equal and have different drawing powers (or relative load factors), or what if 
there is a threshold point in the market share versus flight share relationship, 
or what if an airline's competitors operate more or fewer flights than they really 
should for maximum profit? 
The assumption that all competitors in a market were equal may seem to be a 
severely limiting assumption, in that there are few markets where all competi-
tors are truly equal. Upon closer inspection of the equations, however, it is 
clear that we are not bound by this assumption, and that the model can easily 
be made to apply to unequal competitors. Since industry profits in a market 
are determined by the number of flights actually scheduled, the value of -"Q" 
can be adjusted to conform to the actual number of trips scheduled in the 
market. This new "Q" is the number of "equivalent" equal competitors and 
may be a continuous variable. For example, if three airlines operate in a 
given market, but one dominates the market, we may be dealing with an effec-
tive "Q" of 2.2 rather than 3. By adjusting "0" in this way, it is possible 
to use the various equations shown above to describe the actual situation. 
Furthermore, as shown in Appendix A-3, if the drawing power of one carrier's 
flights is 10% greater than those of its competitors, the optimum integer 
number of flights for that carrier and its competitors probably would remain 
unchanged. 
As shown in Appendix A-4, if there were a threshold value in the market share 
versus flight share relationship (e. g., market share equals 1.10 times flight 
share minus 5), the optimum number of flights for each carrier would be increased 
by the slope of the line (10% for the assumed relationship). Unfortunacdy, 
the total number of flights, costs, and investment would be increased tc.. .he 
extent that the airline managements assumed this slope to be greater than 1.0. 
Appendix A- 4 also shows that the optimum number of flights, costs, and invest-
ment would be increased directly by the exponent in an assumed (or empirically 
derived) curvilinear relationship of market share as a function of flight share, 
for example 2 (Market Share) = K (Flight Share) 
As shown in Appendix A-S, the optimum number of flights for a carrier to operate 
is quite insensitive to the actual number of flights operated by its competitors, 
for the basic diagonal linear relationship of market share = flight share. 
- 18 -
875 
RESULTS OF COMPETITION 
The customer-oriented competitive nature of the air transportation industry has 
resulted in a frequency battle with more carriers providing more non-stop flights 
to more destinations at more times of the day from multiple-airports serving the 
major metropolitan areas. These new flights may have improved the service and 
convenience for the traveling public, but at lower load factors and higher costs. 
Technological developments have resulted in an equipment battle that has further 
compounded the economic impact of the competitive frequency battle. The engi-
neers and manufacturers have designed and developed faster, bigger. and more 
expensive types before the airlines have recouped their capital investments in 
existing fleets. As soon as one airline buys a new design, competitive pres-
sures force the others to follow. with marked increases in total industry 
indebtedness. New technology large jet aircraft have been introduced to both 
replace the smaller first-generation jets and to permit a reduction in seat-mile 
costs in spite of the inflationary cost pressures. However, this growth in seat-
ing capacity has exceeded the normal growth in passengers, also resulting in 
lower load factors. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Chart 9 summarizes the probable impact on flight frequency, costs, capital invest-
ment, and passenger load factors as the result of changes in passenger volume, 
fare level, variable costs per flight, and number of carriers certificated. It can 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRY FLIGHTS 
(AIRPORT-PAIR TIllIE MARICET) 
PROBABlE P£RCENTAGE CHANGE IN, 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONDITlPiS 
FRIIHNCY & COSTS P.l.F. 
PASSENGERS +10 +10 0 
-10 0 -10 
FARE +10 +10 -10 
-10 O· +10 
COS f PER FLIGHT +10 0 0 
-10 +10 -10 
. NUMB£R OF CARRIERS CERTIFICATED 
1_2 +50 to +100 -08 
2_3 +33 to +50 
-29 3-. +12 to +33 -18 
4-5 +7 to +25 -14 
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be seen that under most changes in conditions, the number of flights and costs 
will tend to be increased and the passenger load factor depressed. Only if the 
fare elasticity of demand were -1.0 or more might the passenger load factor 
increase as indicated. Obviously, from a sensitivity standpoint, the number of 
carriers certificated is most critical in determining the increase in flights, costs, 
and capital investment, with a resultant depressant of passenger load factor. 
Case in Point 
This summary has been derived from a rather straightforward analysis, but it 
might be considered theoretical or abl;ltract. One specific example from actual 
operations might be mentioned: in 1969, United's service to and from Hawaii 
produced a pre-tax profit of more than $26 million; the next year, after five 
additional carriers were granted Hawaiian routes, United's Hawaiian service 
had a pre-tax loss of more than $17 million; a change on this one route of more 
than $43 million per year. No carrier is currently earning a reasonable return 
in the Hawaiian service. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that: 
1. The hypotheses which have influenced the current structure of the 
industry and level of competition, as stated earlier, have not led to 
the most efficient alloca.tion of resources for either the traveling 
public or the air transportation industry. 
2. The competitive, economiC, regulatory, and technological environment 
for the air transportation industry has resulted in over-competition 
with resultant: 
a. Excessive numbers of flights, costs, and capital invest-
ments, which must be supported by the fare levels. 
b. Low utilization of productive capacity - low load i.;-:;tors. 
c. Marginal or loss operations. 
3. The maximum number of fully-competitive carriers possible in any 
market can not exceed the ratio of total costs to non-variable 
costs, and is .!!2! a function of the market size, length of haul, unit 
costs, fare level, or aircraft type. With the inherent increases in 
fixed costs which have occurred over time, the ratio of total costs to 
non-variable costs in the air transportation industry appears to range 
from 2 to 3. 
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Let M 
F 
C 
PA 
Nj 
BASIC DERIVATION 
for 
EACH CARRIER 
= Industry Passengers 
= Net Fare per Passenger 
= Variable Costs per Flight 
= Contribution for Carrier A, 
similarly for Band C 
= Optimum Number of Flights 
for Each of j Carriers 
x = Flights by A 
y = Flights by B 
z = Flights by C 
0 '" Number of Carriers 
Total Costs g 
- Variable Costs 
CO,:,DITION A 
(1) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, that is, marginal 
revenues ~ marginal costs. 
2. Market Share = Flight Share. 
For 0 = 2 Competing carriers A and B 
PA = (x:y) MF - xC , Pa = (~)MF - yC 
For maximum contribution, 
"'PA 0 and "'Pa 0 = = 
"'x "'y 
",PA 
= ~x+l1 • 1 - x ] MF 
- C = 0 
"'Pa 
'" 
[(x+Y) • 1- y] 
(x+y)2 , (x+y)7 MF - C 
... x ... y 
Solving simultaneous equations, 
XOPT YOPT N2 
MF 1 MF(~) * = = = x = C 4 C 0 2 
For 0 = 3 Competing carriers A, B, and C 
By similar analysis 
= 
= MF 2 
C x 9 = .MI(Q -1) C 0 2 
For 0 carriers, by extension 
= 
MF(Q-l) 
C 0 2 for each carrier 
* In order for the first derivative of P to result in a .maximum Value for P, the 
second derivative must, of course, be negative. This will be the case when 
o is greater than 1. 
= 0 
COND1TION A (Continued) 
For the total industry, 
BASIC DERIVATIONS 
for 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 
(2) Total Flights = QNO -_ McF (Q Q- 1) 
C X MCF.(Q Q- 1 \ = . Total Variable Costs '" / 
(3) Total Costs = gMF( Q ; 9 
. Operating Ratio = Total Costs Total Revenues 
APPENDIX A-2 
(4) independent of M, F, and C 
(5) 
(6) 
independent of M, F, and C 
For break-even, Operating Ratio = 1.0 
Maximum number of carriers Q* possible 
Q* = 
= 
~ 
g - 1 
Total Costs 
Non-variable Costs 
Again, independent of M, F, and C 
APPENDlX A-3 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION B 
(7) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Competitors in market are not equal, such that the drawing power of 
A's flights; 110% of competitors' flights. 
For 0 ; 3 Competing carriers A, B, and C 
PA = .( l.Ix )MF - xC 1. Ix+y+z 
= (l.Ix+y+z - 1. Ix) 
(I.Ix+y+z)2 
, 
I.IMF-C 
= 
(I.Ix+y+z - y) 
(1 • Ix+y+z)2 MF - C Similarly for Pc 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously, 
XOPT = 
2.4 MF 1.05 MFr -1) 1.05 = = (3.2)2 C C 0 2 N3 
YOPT = 
2.2 MF 0.97 MF (0 - 1) 0.97 N3 = = (3.2)2 C C 0 2 
ZOPT = 
2.2 MF 0.97 N3 = (3.2) 2 C 
That is, a reasonably Significant difference in drawing power (or relative 
load factor) generally will not affect the optimum integer number of 
flights to be operated. 
APPENDIJ( A-It 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION C 
(8) 
1. Each cartier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Market Share = 1.10(FlightShare) - 0.05 
= 
similarly for Band C 
",PA = 1. 1 (x+y+z - x) MF - C , similarly for Band C 
... x (x+y+z)2 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously 
XOPT = YOPT = ZOPT = 1.10 NGl , and 
Total Industry Flights = 1. 109No = 1.10 ~ (9; 1) 
That is, the optimum number of flights for each carrier, and the total 
number of flights (and costs) f-or the industry are increased directly 
by the slope of the regression line of market share against flight share. 
CONDITION D 
(9) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Market Share A = K (x+~+z r ' similarly for Band C 
= 
, 
= ~2+y2+Z2)2x - x 2'2x 
(x2 +y2+Z2)2 
, similarly for Band C 
similarly for Band C 
MF - C , Similarly for Band C 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously, 
XOPT = YOPT = ZOPT = 2 NO ' and 
Total Industry Flights = 29 NO = 2 ~F ( 9 ;21 ) 
That is, the optimum number of flights for each carrier, and the total 
number of flights (and costs) for the industry are increased directly by 
the exponent in the curvilinear relationship of market share as a func-
tion of flight share. 
-APPENDIX A-5 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION E 
(10) 
, 
1. Carrier A schedules for maximum contribution, but 
2. Carrier B actually operates K times N2 flights 
KN K MF(2 - 1) y= 2= c"""'22 = 
3. Market Share = Flight Share 
p = ( x ) MF - xC 
A x+KN2 
= 
(x+KN2 - x) 
(x+KN2 )2 
MF - C 
Solving for maximum contribution, 
X OPT = (KN2 ~)1/2 - KN2 
= (K ~ x ~)'/2 _ K(~) 
= (2K~ - K) N2 
1. ------------:,:;;;0;---:::=:::::::--S---::;.:---::---·--,.-----
.. ;:._--_ ............. _-_ ....... . 
• 
X OPT :;:::·N2 
IF 
0.4 < K < 1.8 
.... 
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I o~------~~--------~----------~----~--__ -o .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
K 
The flatness of this curve means that the optimum number of flights for a 
carrier is quite insensitive to the actual number of flights operated by its 
competitor(s). for the simple linear relatioplilhiP of market share = flight share. 
